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A LOOK AT INTERNAL CONTROL
By GEORGE C. SPARKS, JR., C.P.A.

way of a business function that doesn’t fall
within the modern scope of internal control.
Budgets are as important as the rotation
of personnel; labor turnover and time study
records offer possibilities for control equal
to the use of bookkeeping proofs; and pur
chase and sales controls give advantages the
same as the division of duties does.
Why is it that many successful business
men today will fire an employee who slips
a $10 bill out of the cash register without
a moment’s hesitation; and yet, admit with
a wry smirk that his salesmen’s expense
or “swindle” sheets cost him from $25 to
$50 a week more than they should, saying
simply that there is nothing he can do about
it? Or, what about the owner who exer
cises air-tight control over his cash and
merchandise yet allows employees to take
company trucks and automobiles home
without even considering the impact that
many long weekend trips will have on his
profit picture ? Perhaps the answer to these
riddles lies in the word “education”—not
from the standpoint of the three R’s—but
rather education as to the meaning and
value of internal control in today’s business
picture. The last war saw many slip-shod
and poorly designed business practices de
velop which today’s fiercely competitive
economy will end. What form this ending
will take depends to a large extent on how
well you and I do our jobs.
Why do I say that? Simply because we
as accountants (public or private) are
probably the best prepared individuals con
nected with the business organization to
point up these deficiencies, whatever form
they might take, and to educate employers
or clients as to the benefits to be realized
by eliminating them completely. The catch,
however, is that too often we become so
engrossed with proving our work out to a
mathematical certainty that we fail to real
ize just what is going on around us. The
old cliche is certainly applicable here and
“we are often too close to the forest to see
the trees.”
Basically, I feel that today most busi
nesses have a reasonably good control sys
tem in operation—at least most progressive
managements are cognizant of the need for
controls of some kind. Assuming that an
average company does incur a loss or turn
up some fraudulent activity we immed
iately ask then—“Why did it happen ?” The

It has been conservatively estimated that
American business losses through fraud and
employee dishonesty in the past year
amounted to $500,000,000. Probably it
would be a safe guess that several times
this amount is lost annually through the
simple process of waste and mishandling
of goods. This means then, that costs run
ning into billions of dollars a year are being
incurred by American business as a direct
result of some weakness in control, or per
haps even the complete lack of controls,
At a time like the present where we
pride ourselves on efficiency and production
it must come as quite a shock to find so
much potential profit slipping right out
from under our noses. However, it is actu
ally a direct result of the growth of our
economy as a whole. Perhaps, if we point
out the simple parallel between the develop
ment of the machine age, as we know and
accept it, and the growth of the business
unit itself, we can see the reason for this.
As machines are improved the individual
laborer contributes less and less to the ac
tual construction of the product and be
comes more of a machine watcher or tender.
Likewise, as the business unit grows the
owner, of necessity, must take a less active
part in all of the activities and step back to
a point where he can watch, being forced
to delegate many of his functions to sub
ordinates. The more powers he delegates
the more he must resort to being a watcher
or controller of others.
Only fifty years ago, an outstanding ac
counting scholar of the day visualized in
ternal control as having only three essential
elements, namely:
1.
Division of duties
2.
Use of bookkeeping proofs
3.
Rotation of personnel
Today we find that most ideas as to what
“internal control” encompasses are far
broader in scope. The American Institute
of Accountants’ Committee on Auditing has
given us the following definition:
“Internal Control comprises the plan of
organization and all of the coordinate meth
ods and measures adopted within a business
to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy
and reliability of its accounting data, pro
mote operational efficiency, and encourage
adherence to prescribed managerial poli
cies.”
Currently there is really nothing in the
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answer might be one of several.
You might say the system did just what
it was supposed to do.
Many times we have heard the president
or some other representative of top man
agement explode with indignant wrath when
told of a fraudulent act being discovered
in his company. Usually it runs like this,
“What! Well I want you to completely re
vise the whole system and set it up so that
won’t happen again!”
With a bit more reflection on the subject
that same executive might very well realize
that his system of internal control, if re
sponsible for the culprit being exposed,
actually was adequate all the time. In fact
it is very likely that it accomplished ex
actly what it was designed to do—that is,
to reflect the unusual or the irregular act
which led to the disclosure of fraud. The
important point to keep in mind is that
there might well be a great deal more to
worry about where everything checks out
perfectly each day, since the reason for such
perfection could easily be an inadequate
system of control which allows things to
slip by unnoticed.
Your second answer as to why it happened
might be to the effect that the controls are
and always have been present, but the per
sonnel in charge of carrying them out either
didn’t realize what they were supposed to
be doing or else their work was being done
in a negligent haphazard manner.
For instance, a client of ours operates a
number of retail outlets throughout this
area. Close checks of sales records are
made by tying in closely with the regularly
submitted cash register readings. In fact,
we even found it worth while a few years
back to insist that the register tapes accom
pany the reported readings. All cash must
be deposited as soon as possible after the
day of receipt and a duplicate deposit ticket
submitted in support thereof. All disburse
ments are made by the main office and all
bank statements are received and reconciled
by the main office. On the surface every
thing is controlled—yet, on two occasions
in the past several years we have picked up
discrepancies that disclosed managers using
company funds, through the simple expedi
ent of testing deposits and the dates on
which actually made. They were using the
time-work plan of withholding deposits an
extra day or two and using the money for
their own purposes. Invariably though they
became victims of their own poor bookkeep
ing. As the deposit would lag behind fur
ther and further it would become confused
with and be made after that of a later day’s

sales. When this happens, there can be
little doubt that manipulation is taking
place.
Here an office employee was reconciling
the bank accounts monthly and had even
been instructed to look for just such in
stances. The moral is that even if the con
trols exist they are no better than the
efficiency with which the personnel applies
them. Or, if you are on the other side of
the fence, perhaps the moral is that you
should hire a good accountant to keep up
with your defalcations.
A third, and very common-sense answer
as to why a loss took place might well be
that changes in procedures or lines of
responsibility have been made without con
sideration being given to changing corres
ponding controls.
One company employing door-to-door
salesmen required all charges for work to
be calculated in the store office by the man
ager or the office clerk and that payments
were to be made directly to the store.
One of the salesmen showed considerable
enthusiasm for his job and an eagerness
to do more work than was expected of him.
First, he volunteered to prepare the job
tickets and invoices for his work. Next, he
offered to put through the charges in the
office, and finally, assumed the responsibility
for collection. The office clerk was only too
pleased to be relieved of some of her duties.
However, it will be seen that the net result
was the placing of the entire accounting and
collections routine in the hands of the sales
man. Before long he began to charge less
than the correct amounts to accounts receiv
able, but collected in full from the custom
ers. The difference went into his own pocket.
Unfortunately for the salesman, one of
the customers came into the office to pay
his account. When it was discovered that
the charge against him in the accounts re
ceivable ledger was lower than his copy of
the invoice, investigation soon revealed
fraud.
The controls were sufficient in this case;
they were simply not being maintained.
Another case involved a large department
store where credit slips for return of mer
chandise required the department buyer’s
signature. Due to infrequent returns and
the resalability of the merchandise this pro
cedure was relaxed in a department han
dling household equipment in order to
permit several senior sales clerks to approve
these credits.
Shortly after the change small increases
began to be noticed in the ratio of returned
sales. When the inventory shrinkage figures
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began to show a slight increase also, interest
was stirred enough to cause investigation.
The examination included contact with
customers whose names were shown on the
return slips, and it was immediately dis
covered that some of the names were fraud
ulent. The fraudulent slips were traced to
one of the senior clerks. When confronted
with the facts, he confessed to originating
and approving completely fraudulent re
turns over a considerable period. Credit
slips were originated by him when no mer
chandise was returned, and the proceeds
had been collected in cash. The total amount
of loss was over $50,000 due to a relaxing
of controls over returned merchandise with
out a compensating change to offset an
obvious weakness.
Many times the answer as to why a loss
is suffered is simply that no appreciable
measures can be taken to offset the possibil
ity of them happening. This arises more
often than not where the possibility of loss
is realized but it is accepted more or less
as a “calculated” risk on the part of man
agement.
I have in mind a very recent case in which
I confronted the management of a small
variety store chain with the fact that one
of its stores was showing a constant de
clining gross margin on sales. When the
subject was first presented the margin had
dropped from a respectable 37.5% to about
36% and management simply attributed it
to a wave of shoplifting and possibly lower
markups on purchases. Since the neighbor
hood was of questionable character that
explanation seemed feasible. To make a long
story short, it took a loss from operations
to jar management into taking concrete
action. As long as a profit was being rea
lized no one seriously thought there was
anything too wrong. Even then it took a
month or more before a break developed
which led to disclosure of what was happen
ing, and that break was a clerk under
ringing a sale a mere 50 cents. A floor man
caught the under-ring, took the girl back to
the office and before it was over with got
a substantial background of what was hap
pening. By quick action and cooperation of
a shopping service, they were able to round
up twelve clerks that were involved—all
confessing to stealing through the following
methods :
1. Under-ringing sales, the cash being
picked up by another girl from the
register at an opportune time.
2. Slipping merchandise into their stock
ings and undergarments when behind
the counter.

3. By use of accomplices that would pose
as customers and receive possibly $5.00
or $6.00 worth of merchandise in a
bag for only $1.00. At a later time they
would get together and split the gains.
When all the smoke cleared, losses ap
proximating $25,000 were determined—
much more than the so-called “calculated
risk” was expected to amount to.
Another situation that is difficult to build
real controls around is the route salesman
operation where promotion “deals” are
made whereby the purchase of a given
quantity entitles the customer to a free
carton of goods. Oftentimes the salesman
is tempted to keep the “free” merchandise
to sell later and pocket the receipts. The
best protection against this is widespread
publicity and activity by sales supervisors.
Usually, the supervisors will call on the
larger customers and, in addition, they may
ride the routes to assist the salesman at
the time of the “deal.”
Very often the finest system of control
is rendered worthless where personal friend
ships and old time acquaintances are in
volved. For example, I read of this case
some time ago:
The thief in this situation was accounts
receivable clerk and since all receipts were
by check he was also responsible for making
deposits. This failure to establish close con
trol over the checks as well as to separate
the duties of cashier and accounts receiv
able clerk proved to be the weakness of the
system. The checks would be stamped with
the special endorsement “Pay to the order
of X bank, XYZ Corporation,” and this was
felt to be protection against anyone short
ing the receipts. However, our thief had his
methods too, and when he would make a
deposit a fairly large check would be pre
sented separately to the bank teller and he
would ask for cash. The explanation in this
particular case was that the company needed
cash for black market purchases which could
not show on the books. Being well known,
his explanation was accepted not only at
the original bank but at a second bank when
the account was changed over. In all, the
fraud amounted to about $166,000, covered
a period of time of over three years, involved
two banks, survived several independent
audits, and was only discovered when a new
teller questioned the validity of the transac
tion.
Another case based on personal relation
ships involved a company operating grain
elevators in small rural communities. One
of its part-time managers was also a town
official and well respected in his community.
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